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Uncertain Responses by Five-Year-Olds in a Memory Monitoring Task
This study investigated memory monitoring in preschool children via the 
use of inferential observation of task performance. Forty five-year 
olds performed in 'a pictorial serial-probe recognition task that 
featured an uncertain response. Their behavioral responses without the 
use of self-report were examined because the literature suggests that 
the use of verbal reports to assess metacognition in young children has 
many potential limitations. Participants were given an option to escape 
trials of their choosing, perhaps those that yielded the most 
indeterminate memory traces. It was hypothesized that five-year-olds 
would accurately monitor their short-term memory and the pattern of 
their escape responses would mirror the serial position curve of their 
primary memory performance, as. has been documented in adult humans and 
rhesus monkeys. However, the pattern of responding in our five-year- 
olds differed from that of the adult humans and non-human primates. 
Children's primary memory performance was reflected in a pronounced 
serial position curve, that corresponds to the curves found in adult
Director: Wendy E. Shields,
human and monkey studies but the pattern of their escape responses was 
very different. It appears that the five-year-olds use disparate 
strategies when facing uncertainty. These strategies, as well as 
implications for future research in this area are discussed.
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Uncertain Responses by Five-Year-Olds in a 
Memory Monitoring Task 
Cognitive psychological literature was first introduced to the 
term "meta" in relation to memory in 1971/ when John Flavell coined the 
term "metamemory" as one's knowledge of one's own memory (Flavell,
1971). The study of metamemory or metacognition (cognition about 
cognition) has been for decades an exciting albeit problematic area of 
research. In many of his works, Flavell (e.g., 1979, 1981, and 1987) 
attempted to construct an appropriate taxonomy of the concept of 
metacognition. In particular, he made a distinction between two aspects 
of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences.
Metacognitive knowledge refers to the portion of knowledge one has 
available in long-term memory regarding facts about cognition in general 
and about one's own cognition in particular. People can often verbalize 
this information. Hence metacognitive knowledge is considered- 
declarative. For example, John Smith knows that it is impossible for a 
person to perfectly recall an 18-digit number in a serial recall task.
In fact, he knows that, in his own case, recalling an-8-digit number 
would be an unprecedented feat.
Metacognitive knowledge includes three different clusters of 
variables: person, task, and strategy. Person variables refer to the 
knowledge and beliefs humans have about themselves as cognitive beings 
(e.g., John Smith knows the capacity of his own short-term memory). Task 
variables correspond to the knowledge of goals or objectives of a 
cognitive activity (e.g., John knows that the task requires the recall 
of an 18-digit number).. Finally, strategy■ variables refer to cognitions 
or other behaviors utilized to achieve these goals (e.g., John knows 
that he should use the "Palm Pilot" his mother gave him for his 
birthday!.
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Metacognitive experiences are any conscious cognitive or emotional 
experiences that an individual encounters before, during, or after a 
cognitive activity. There are two aspects of metacognitive experiences: 
monitoring and control (or regulation). Cognitive monitoring is the 
ability to assess one's own cognitive processes. It includes memory, 
comprehension and reality monitoring. Memory monitoring (e.g., Hart, 
1965) includes assessments of one's memory with regard to the presence 
or absence of certain information. Comprehension monitoring (e.g., 
Markman, 1977) involves the realization that one does or does not 
understand incoming information. Reality monitoring (e.g., Johnson &, 
Raye, 1981) refers to the ability to distinguish between'dreaming, 
imagining and reality.
Cognitive control or regulation is the action taken to affect the 
course of cognitive processing. This action is the result of information 
obtained from the monitoring process. For example, if the monitoring of 
comprehension during reading indicates a lack of understanding, one 
might decide to switch from "automatic reading pilot" to a more 
effortful, attentive style of reading.
Perils with the Definition
From its inception, metacognition has been a difficult and rather 
complex area of study. On several occasions metacognition has been 
referred to as a fuzzy and inadequately understood concept (Brown, 1987; 
Wellman, 1983). I will now discuss some of the issues that have troubled 
the scientific community with regard to this topic.
First, the fact that metacognition has been defined as both 
knowledge about cognition, and the monitoring/regulation of cognition 
creates a problem for the interpretation of research findings. These two 
components of metacognition are interconnected. However, theix nature 
and course of development might-be quite different. Knowledge about . 
cognition, declarative knowledge, is presumed to be definable and
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stable, and is usually documented rather late in development (Brown,
1987). The monitoring and regulation of cognition, on the other hand,
may make use of procedural knowledge, which often is not statable. Brown
suggested that monitoring and regulation of cognition might be dependent.
primarily on the task and circumstances and therefore could be
relatively age-independent. Some researchers have argued that labeling
both a person’s knowledge about cognition and his or her use of that
knowledge with one term is ill-advised. Hence the two-component
definition should be reduced, leaving out the monitoring and regulatory
processes (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982) . To date, there is no general
agreement on this definitional issue (Baker, 1994).
The second controversy in the literature deals with the
appropriate distinction of what can be considered "meta" and what should
be labeled as "cognitive" (Brown, 1987). The literature is confusing 
(Baker, 1994). Flavell (e.g., 1979) distinguished between these two, 
stating that cognitive progression is achieved via the use of cognitive 
strategies, whereas the monitoring of this progress employs 
metacognitive strategies. For example, the use of mnemonics to memorize 
the names of students in my class would be a cognitive strategy, and the 
use of mnemonics to monitor or examine my memorization enterprise (as in 
a self-test of memory) would be a metacognitive strategy.
The third disagreement is the argument whether metacognition can
be both conscious and unconscious (Baker, 1994). This brings us back to 
the original Flavellian taxonomy of metacognition, namely that this 
concept consists of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive 
experiences. Metacognitive experiences Can refer to the cognitions or 
feelings that are easily accessed by an individual, such as the 
anticipation of a problem before reading a chapter on quantum physics. 
However, this experience can also refer to feelings that may be on the
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brink of consciousness, such as a fleeting feeling of delight after
accomplishing a cognitive task (Gombert, 1993).
.Moreover, Brown (1987) noted that metacognitive knowledge is
Conscious and therefore should be declarative or definable, but an
individual is assumed to have this knowledge only if he or she can state
or define it. Therefore, this criterion is circular. In addition, Brown
distinguishes between self-regulation during learning, which is often an
unconscious experience,.and conscious manipulation of one's thoughts,
which is. thinking about thinking or conscious regulation. She states
that this distinction has been confused in the metacognition literature.
The former refers to the active procedure of trial-and-error (systematic
error detection and correction) evident even in very young children's
learning. However, unless these behaviors reflect deliberate strategic
action, they should not be termed "metacognitive1'. The latter
corresponds- to Piagetian reflected abstraction that emerges at the stage
of formal operations, and allows one to solve problems or test
hypotheses in thought or on a mental plane, which is obviously a very
conscious experience. Therefore, Brown concluded: "Whatever distinctions'
must be made in order to render metacognition a more malleable concept,
this one is a fine candidate for inclusion in the list" (p. 96).
Previous Research on Metacoqnition in Children
The first attempts to assess metacognition in children were in the
area of memory (metamemory— Flavell, Friedrichs & Hoyt, 1970). Since
then, metacognition has been studied in many other areas- of cognition,
for example, comprehension . (Markman, 1977; Revelle, Wellman &
Karabenick, 1985), communication (Shatz, 1978), reasoning (Kuhn, 1989),
and reading ('Garner, 1987)
Comprehension monitoring. Markman (1977) conducted a study on
comprehension monitoring in first, second, and third graders. In her
experiment, she used two tasks— a card game and a magic trick. The
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children were presented with insufficient information about these tasks. 
For children in one group the tasks were described and demonstrated, for 
children in the other group the tasks were only described. The results 
of this study showed that children were more likely to question the 
instructions when the task was demonstrated, and the older children 
realized the insufficiency of the information before the younger 
children did. The first graders had almost no awareness of the fact that 
their comprehension of the tasks was flawed. Markman (1977) suggested 
that the youngest children in this study processed the information on a 
very superficial level, without mentally performing the instructions, 
and they became aware that the information was inadequate only after 
they were prompted to repeat the instruction or even actually perform 
the tasks. She suggested that the children processed the instructions 
more carefully, and were able to detect their comprehension failure only 
after they made an effort to execute the task.
A flaw in such reasoning was indicated by Revelle et al( (1985). 
They suggested that the younger children's requests for further 
explanation, which were stated only after the unsuccessful attempts to 
enact the instructions, did not necessarily reflect comprehension 
monitoring, but could have just been a reaction to their inability to 
execute the task. Requests for additional information could be 
considered strong evidence for comprehension monitoring only if they 
occurred before the actual attempts to perform the task. On the other 
hand, the absence of verbal requests for clarification does not 
necessarily indicate the absence of comprehension monitoring. Perhaps 
Markman's (1977) study would have benefited from the employment of 
additional measures which would evaluate comprehension monitoring, such 
as assessment of nonverbal behavior.
Revelle et al. (1985) conducted a study that employed a quasi-
naturalistic method to examine comprehension monitoring in children 31-
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51 months of age. They combined experimental methods with naturalistic
settings. Experimenters' requests were standardized and structured
allowing for accurate analysis of children's responses, while task and
circumstances were simple and children were accustomed to them.
Moreover, the methodology was further improved by utilization of a
performance task as opposed to a judgment task. Performance tasks
evaluate children's detection of comprehension difficulty after being
exposed to questionable messages. Judgment tasks, on the other hand,
require more explicit judgments of the quality of a message, such as by
specifying whether the message was "faulty" or not. This latter.task was’
used, for example, in Markman's (1977) study. The experiment of Revelle
et al. involved two play-sessions--one was playing in a sandbox and the
other was a pretend tea party. During these play-sessions children were
presented with a variety of requests, some of which posed compliance or
comprehension problems. Performance in response to these requests was
recorded. The results of this study indicated that 3- and 4-year-olds
possess basic comprehension monitoring skills. Participants of four
years of age exhibited successful and competent monitoring of all types
of problems. Discrimination between problematic and non-problematic
requests, as well as proper utilization of strategies for resolving the
problems were also evidenced in 3-year-olds.
This positive evidence of comprehension monitoring in very young 
children, which is in contrast with the general findings of earlier 
studies (e.g., Markman, 1977; Robinson & Robinson, 1977) illustrates the 
importance of choosing appropriate tools and settings when assessing 
metacognition in children.
Knowledge about memory. Several studies assessed children's 
knowledge of facts about memory by investigating their understanding of 
person, task, and strategy variables. The inaugural work in the area of 
children's metamemory was a study conducted by Flavell et al. (1970).
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Although this experiment investigated children's memory monitoring, it
also examined-children's knowledge of person variables in respect to
memory, namely the knowledge children have about their memory span.
Children were asked to predict how many items they would be able to
serially recall from a presented set of pictorial stimuli. Series of
pictures were presented until the children labeled the sequence as too
long for them to recall, or until the whole sequence was presented (10
pictures). After the prediction, the experimenter read aloud a list of
familiar object names and the children were asked to recall the items
serially. The difference between their actual and predicted memory span
was assessed. The results suggested that older children were more
accurate at predicting their memory span than younger children. The
majority (64%) of 4 1/2-year old children had an unrealistic concept of
their memory span. In fact, these children claimed that they would
serially recall all of the items, even on the longest lists.
Wellman (1977a) researched children's understanding of additional 
variables that affect memory. He showed that even 3-year-olds knew that 
more items are harder to remember than fewer items (task variable), and 
some also knew that noise intervened with remembering (person variable). 
Older children in this study (5-year-olds) had an additional 
understanding of person variables (e.g., age) and certain strategy 
variables that could aid in the retrieval of items. To address the issue 
•of discriminant validity, Wellman assessed children's understanding of 
variables that are both relevant and irrelevant to cognitive 
performance. Without this contro.l, children could b.e credited with the 
understanding of variables that affect cognitive performance 
(metacognitive knowledge) in situations when they are simply stating 
that "everything affects everything"’ (Wellman, 1985, p. 197). It was 
found that the majority of 3-year-old children understood that, for
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example, a person's hair color or weight .were unrelated to cognitive
performance.
Wellman (1985) noted that young children's unrealistic assessments 
of their memory span in Flavell et al. (1970). could be explained by the 
fact that memory performance is influenced not only by the number of 
items but also by the effort and time spent on a particular memory task. 
Children seemed to attribute different weights to these variables. He 
also stated that the degree to which children understand'the interaction 
of cognitive variables and their concepts of the human cognitive system 
as a whole, including its features and functions, are still unknown.
Memory monitoring. Memory monitoring in children has often been 
investigated via the use of feeling-of-knowing judgments (Wellman,
1977b; Cultice, Somerville', & Wellman, 1983; Butterfield, Nelson & Peck, 
1988). A feeling-of-knowing judgment is a person's insight about the 
status of an item in his or .her memory. This judgment can be positive, 
which implies that one knows that he o.r she has some information in 
memory, even if the information is not accessible at the moment. Tip-of- 
the-tongue experiences are a subset of positive feeling-of-knowing 
judgments. A negative feeling-of-knowing judgment is a decision that a 
particular item is not stored in memory and cannot be retrieved or 
recognized.
Wellman (1977b) examined children's memory monitoring using 
feeling-of-knowing judgments and assessing tip-of-the-tongue 
experiences. Children from 6 to 9 years of age were presented with line 
drawings of concrete objects. Some of these objects were easy to name 
(e.g., banana), and some were less common and, therefore, harder to name 
(e.g., metronome). The" task, had three phases: naming, judgment and 
recognition. Children were asked to name a picture> and if they were 
unable to name it,~ they were asked whether they would be able to 
recognize it upon hearing it (the feeling-of-knowing judgment). The
Uncertain Responses 9 
accuracy of monitoring was measured by comparing the judgments and the
results of later recognition. The results of this study suggested that
children's ability to make feeling-of-knowing judgments increased with
age. Kindergartners were only slightly better than chance at predicting
their later recognition whereas third graders were extremely accurate.
Cultice et al. (1983) tested preschoolers' memory monitoring using 
the same sequence as Wellman (1977b) but with improved methodology... The 
naming, judgment and recognition sequence involved naming people from a 
set of photographs. The authors argued that proper names and real 
pictures, as opposed to object naming and line drawings, provided a more 
sensitive and sensible test for preschool-aged children because specific 
nominals (proper nouns) are among the first words children learn 
(Nelson, 1973) . Moreover, even young children know that it is important 
to remember people's names, and..they have much experience .with recalling 
or failing to recall them. The results of this study showed that 
preschoolers were evaluating an item's memory status on the basis of 
relevant cues like familiarity. For example, some children made 
spontaneous comments in.the naming phase such as, "she looks familiar" 
and "I don’t know him but I have seen him". Consequently, preschoolers 
were rather accurate in their memory monitoring. In addition, this study 
demonstrated that positive feeling-of-knowing judgments lead to more 
retrieval efforts in school-aged children. This suggested that they were 
using monitoring judgment's to regulate their responses.
Some researchers have argued that the original feeling-of-knowing 
paradigm, which utilizes absolute yes/no judgments, relies heavily on a 
participant's threshold for claiming to know, and this threshold may be 
affected by the participant's mental and chronological age (Butterfield 
et al., 1988). Butterfield et al. modified the original paradigm to 
employ relative comparison judgments. Among the participants were 6-,
10- and 18-year-olds. Relative feeling-of-knowing judgments involves a
Uncertain Responses 10 
comparison of two words. Each pair was chosen from one of the following
three categories: easy and difficult words, previously correctly and
incorrectly defined words, previously incorrectly and undefined words.
The participant was asked to judge which word of each pair was more
likely to be recognized. It was hypothesized that incorrectly defined
words would yield stronger feelings-of-knowing than words for which the
definition was absent. The results of this study contradicted Wellman's
(1977b) notion that accuracy of memory monitoring increases with the age
of a child. The data from Butterfield et al. revealed that 6-year-olds
had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than older children. Older
children tended to overestimate their recognition abilities.
Butterfield et al. (1988) suggested that even if younger children 
sometimes make accurate judgments about their feeling-of-knowing, they 
may be able to do so only under certain conditions. This may occur when 
making feeling-of-knowing judgments is the only activity required from 
them, or when they are instructed to do so. The authors indicate that 
these conditions need to be more accurately specified in future studies 
to be able to account for developmental differences in memory, 
monitoring.
Methodological Issues
The literature suggests that one of the significant questions in 
the area of metacognition which needs to be addressed concerns the 
adequacy of tools that have been used to assess this cognitive. 
phenomenon (Meichenbaum, Burland, Gruson & Cameron., 1985) . Most 
metacognition studies have relied primarily .on verbal data. The 
controversy of conscious versus unconscious components of metacognition 
discussed earlier poses a problem by itself in light of this fact, and 
there are several other issues that need to be considered as well.
First is the issue of introspective access raised by Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977). These authors suggested that humans might not be able to
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directly access their higher order cognitive processes, and when'they
make an effort to recount these processes after the behavior occurred,
their reports may be a reflection of post-facto rationalization rather■
than true introspection. In some instances these reports may be
accurate, and in others not. They suggested several factors that might
give rise to errors in verbal reports. One of the most prominent factors
is a time gap between the occurrence of a cognitive process and the
verbal report, where the accuracy of the report is inversely related to
the time. Even though their original article raised a great deal of
debate in the literature (for review, see Guerin & Innes, 1981; White,
1985), it nevertheless, called for discretion in interpretation of
results in studies that use post-performance verbal report on cognitive
processes (Meichenbaum et al., 1985).
Another obstacle in assessing metacognition via the use of verbal 
reports stems from the fact that a significant proportion of the 
population under investigation may not be suitable for this form of 
assessment. This subset includes young children or cognitively impaired 
individuals. The verbal report may not be appropriate for them due to 
many of the following reasons: they may not comprehend the question, or 
be able to verbally indicate their experience, or they may simply be 
lacking the motivation to give a report.
Wellman (1985) noted that cross-cultural differences in the use of 
metaphors and mental verbs to describe internal events might also 
confound research findings in this area. He also stated that age- 
related language differences are most obvious in interview tasks, and 
therefore suggested that research on metacognition in young children 
should utilize yes-no judgments and verbal or nonverbal indication of 
choices rather than open-ended interview tasks.
Wellman (1985) further suggested that much of the research on 
concepts of cognition tapped instead the children's understanding of
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mental language (e.g., words such as think, know and remember). The fact 
that some children fail to have the appropriate semantic knowledge is 
not necessarily indicative of their concepts of cognition. Johnson and 
Wellman (1980) assessed 4-year-old children's understanding of the 
following verbs: "remember", "know” and "guess". Children seemed to 
confuse them and they appeared oblivious to the factors that separate 
the mental.processes described by these verbs. Only further examination 
of 'their responses revealed that these children had at least some 
understanding of these words, and that they could differentiate between 
them- on the basis of their correspondence to reality. Furthermore, 
Johnson and Maratsos (1977) documented separate understanding of the 
words: "think" and "know" in 4-year-old children, but not in 3-year- 
olds. The failure to find differentiated understanding of these words, 
however, does not necessarily mean that 3-year-old children are unable 
to distinguish between these two mental processes. A story and question 
task utilized in this study to assess children's comprehension of mental 
verbs might have been insensitive to the abilities of the 3-year-olds
because of their limited language ability.
The third problem in this area relates to the veracity of post- 
facto verbal reports. Information-processing theories of cognition
suggest a two-process approach to thinking: automatic vs. effortful
processing (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). In light of the information- 
processing approach, it is possible that unless the experimental task is 
carefully chosen, participants may engage in automatic processing when 
they may not be aware of their cognitions during performance 
(Meichenbaum et al., 1985). Borkowski (1985) suggested that conscious, 
and therefore reportable, metacognitive activity is likely to take place 
in a situation where one is engaged in a complex or novel task that 
involves judgment and decision making during the performance. Otherwise, 
participants may engage in post-facto rationalizations when offering a
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verbal report on the cognitive processes that influenced their behavior
(Meichenbaum et al., 1985). Therefore, studies that attempt to assess 
participants' cognitions and metacognitions via the use of verbal 
reports must choose tasks that involve conscious processes.-
The previous discussion of the problems concerning verbal data,- 
especially interviews and post-performance reports, was not meant to 
suggest' that these techniques are worthless to metacognition research. 
They were specified to draw attention to the potential liabilities these 
techniques may possess. ■ Meichenbaum et al. (1985) offered several 
additional techniques for the assessment of metacognition. Among those 
suggested were immediate self-report in the form of the think-aloud 
technique or interviews during the performance, and observation of 
spontaneous self-directed (private) speech. Finally, the authors 
proposed the inferential observation of task performance without the use 
of self-report as another technique that would be useful in the 
assessment of metacognition. Surprisingly, the employment of this 
behavioral measure in research has been sporadic. Even if we set aside 
the questions raised about the adequacy of using verbal reports per se 
as the tools to assess metacognition, one important problem remains. In 
particular, verbal reports may be less or not at all appropriate for 
young children and language- or cognitively-impaired individuals that 
have problems comprehending questions and/or verbally expressing their 
responses and experiences. A'behavioral measure that does not employ 
verbal reports ’could improve the validity and accuracy of the 
assessment. In addition, it could open a window of.opportunity to 
explore populations that were previously only partially reachable and 




Creating difficulty in cognitive tasks has been used in many 
studies of metacognition in humans (e.g. Markman, 1977; Revelle et al., 
1985; Robinson & Robinson, 1977). However, most of these studies 
utilized verbal tasks and required verbal responses. Recently, 
researchers interested in comparing the metacognitive abilities of human, 
and nonhuman animals have used an innovative approach to the study of 
metacognition (Shields, Smith, & Washburn, 1997; Smith, Schull, Strote, 
McGee, Egnor, & Erb, 1995; Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, & Washburn,
1998; Smith, Shields,- Schull, & Washburn, 1997). The researchers in this 
area did not have the luxury of all of their participants being verbal. 
Therefore they employed.an uncertainty paradigm in which simple 
.perceptual and memory tasks were used. These were designed to create 
difficulty for the participants. Crucially, participants were also 
provided with a concrete response that allowed them to deal with the 
difficulty and uncertainty. This response was termed the uncertain or 
"escape" response because it allowed participants to abandon trials of 
their choosing.
Smith et al. (1998) used the uncertainty paradigm to test memory
monitoring in human adults and nonhuman primates. First, a relatively 
simple, nonverbal memory task was required so that rhesus monkeys could 
participate. Second, some trials had to be made more difficult or 
uncertain than others. Third, an uncertain response had to be made 
available. The researchers then determined whether uncertain responses 
occurred more for difficult than for less difficult trials.
The task that Smith et al. (1998) chose was a serial probe 
recognition task. In a classic serial probe recognition (SPR) task, a 
list of pictorial items is presented to participants. Subsequently, a 
probe item is presented. Participants are given a binary response option 
and instructed to respond "there" if the probe was from the previously
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presented list or "not there" if the probe was not presented in the
list. Smith et- al. elegantly innovated the SPR task by expanding the
binary response pool by adding a third response, the uncertain response.
This third response allowed participants to abandon the current trial in
favor of an easier trial.
To fulfill the requirement of differential difficulty among 
trials, Smith et al. (1998) took advantage of the well-known serial 
position effect, one of the most robust of memory phenomena. Ebbinghaus 
(1885/1913) labeled the improved memory for items at the beginning of 
the list a primacy effect, and the augmented memory for the final items 
a recency effect. This U-shaped serial position curve has been 
documented in memory.studies utilizing recall and recognition tests, 
with lists of items consisting of words, non-sense syllables and 
pictures (for a review, see Crowder, 1976). The serial position effect 
,has been found in humans as well as in several nonhuman animal species 
(e.g., Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966; Sands & Wright, 1980; Roberts & Kraemer, 
1981; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick & Cook, 1985).
Smith et al. (1998) suggested that-in the memory task utilized in 
their' experiment, participants would experience an increased amount of 
uncertainty for the middle section of the memory items relative to the 
uncertainty experienced for the initial and final items. Therefore, 
participants should use the uncertain response more for the mid-list 
items than for the initial and final items. Indeed, these results were 
obtained. The participants confronted the memory task in an adaptive, 
manner. They appeared to engage in memory monitoring and employed the 
escape response when they encountered.the most indeterminate memory 
traces.
In addition, Smith et al. (1998) proposed that the overall 
performance on trials in which the escape response is available should 
be superior to the performance on trials where the escape response is
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not allowed. This means that when the escape response is available,
participants can either escape, if they feel uncertain, or they can
volunteer a primary response ("there" or "not there"), if they are more
confident of the corrfect answer. If the participants monitor their
memory adaptively, the escape response allows them to avoid trials for
which they do not know the correct answer. Under these circumstances, if
participants actually volunteer a primary response, their error rate
should be relatively low. These "voluntary try" trials should yield a
higher proportion of correct responses than the "forced try" trials, in
which the escape response is,unavailable and participants are forced to
make a primary response even for the probes about which they feel
uncertain. Again, the results of their study supported this hypothesis.
The procedure employed by Smith et al. (1998) has been used to 
test memory monitoring in human adults and nonhuman primates. It has 
never been used to test cognitive monitoring in children. Given the 
aforementioned problems in assessing metacognition, the simplicity of 
this.task and its nonverbal nature could make it a feasible tool in
testing these cognitive mechanisms in children.
Support for Using the SPR Task
Although the SPR task has not been used to examine memory 
monitoring in children, other memory phenomena have been investigated 
via the use of similar techniques. A probe-type pictorial memory task 
has been used to investigate short-term memory processes in children of 
various ages (Atkinson, Hansen & Bernbach, 1.964; Hansen, 1965; Calfee, 
Hetherington & Waltzer,- 1966) as well as in children with mental 
retardation (Ellis & Munger, 1966) in the past. The serial position 
effect was documented in these studies of memory.
The recognition abilities in children of various ages have been
documented using several different techniques. One of these procedures
involves' presenting a list of items to participants while asking them to
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indicate whether or not an item is a repeat. Corsini, Jacobus & Leonard
(1969) tested preschool children's recognition skills for words and
pictures using this procedure and found a superior recognition for
pictures. Evidence of good recognition memory for pictures in preschool
children was subsequently supported by many researchers (e.g. Brown and
Scott, 1971; Perlmutter & Myers, 1974, 1976). Brown and Campione (1972)
noted that the ability to detect repeating pictures is well established
in preschool children, and their recognition of distinct pictorial ,
stimuli is similar to that which has been reported for adults. The
research suggested no reason to expect hindrance in using a serial probe
recognition task in order to assess memory monitoring in preschool
children.
In addition, Butterfield et al. (1988) in their study of the 
developmental aspects of memory monitoring emphasized the need for 
making a distinction between a person's potential monitoring ability and 
the utilization of the products from the person's 'monitoring. However, 
the most frequently used paradigm for assessing memory monitoring, the 
feeling-of-knowing judgment, does not allow for this distinction, 
because it taps the former but it leaves out the latter. The feeling-of- 
knowing judgment is a person's insight about the status of an item in 
his or her memory. Young children may discriminate information from 
feeling-of-knowing judgments in their memories but it is unclear whether 
they can spontaneously use it in a proper way (Butterfield et al.,
1988). Clearly, a behavioral measure assessing memory monitoring is 
needed.
Finally, the cognitive literature has made.an insistent call for 
improved assessment of cognitive monitoring in children, such as the use 
of simple, well-defined cognitive tasks, which could tap children's 
cognitive monitoring without introducing confounding variables built 
into the assessment tools utilized in past studies. Developmental
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psychologists recorded some of the metacognitive limitations of younger
children (Baker, 1994), On the other hand, one should keep on mind that
science can be no better than its methods. Therefore, among the most
important responsibilities one has as a scientist is to continually
c
search for improved ways to explore the phenomena in question.
This study employed the inferential observation of task 
performance as a behavioral measure to assess memory monitoring in five- 
year old children. The uncertainty paradigm of Smith et al. (1998)
served as a procedural guideline to induce and consider memory 
monitoring. The indicated procedure was used to minimize the problems - of 
discriminant validation as well as the potential liabilities of 
utilizing verbal reports in the assessment of metacognition.
It was hypothesized that five-year-olds would behaviorally 
demonstrate adept memory monitoring via the use of the uncertain 
response when the most indeterminate memory traces were probed. 
Specifically, their use of the uncertain response would be an invert 
reflection of the serial position curve of their memory performance. 
Moreover, when their performance is compared to a group that was denied 
the escape response, the performance of the former would be' superior. 
This reduction in error rate would demonstrate an adaptive use of the - 
uncertainty response and memory monitoring.
Method
. Participants
Participants of this experiment were 43 4.5- to 5.5-year-old 
children (mean age = 5.09, SD = 0.33) from the Missoula, Montana, 
community. Recruitment of the participants was conducted via information 
sheets distributed to the parents by the investigator, her research 
assistant and the directors of day-care institutions. The parents were 
asked to make an appointment either in person or by placing a phone call 
to the -investigator if they were interested in the study.. Participants
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were randomly assigned to the following'two groups: experimental (21
children) and control (19 children) .. The data obtained from three
children were excluded from the analysis because of their inability
and/or iack of motivation to follow the instructions.
Apparatus
An IBM compatible computer was used to present pictorial stimuli 
on a monitor in both the pilot study and the actual experiment. An 
EZscreen™ touch screen add-on attached to a 15-inch color monitor 
recorded the responses. Participants were seated on a height-adjustable 
chair at arm's length away from the monitor.
Procedure
Prior to the experiment, an informed consent form was filled out 
by a parent or legal guardian of each child.
The experimental procedure was analogous to the one used in Smith 
et al. (1998), Experiments 1 and 3. Each trial consisted of two phases.
The first phase involved the presentation of a list of to-be-remembered 
items, and the second phase consisted of the presentation of response 
choices. The number of choices depended on whether a participant was 
assigned to the control or experimental group. The control group was 
given a classic (binary-response) serial probe recognition task. The 
experimental group was allowed an additional choice— the escape or 
uncertainty response. The participants were assigned to the control and 
experimental groups randomly.
Stimulus presentation phase. On each trial> participants made a 
voluntary, trial-initiation response by touching a white circle 1 cm in 
diameter positioned in the upper left corner of the screen. Below the 
circle, there was a number that'indicated the number of the trial. 
Participants were then presented with a list of pictures chosen from 
among 81 digitized color drawings of common objects such as an apple, a
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tiger, and a camera. Prior to this study, four five-year-olds were asked 
to name 101 drawings that had been used by Smith et al. (1998). The 
selected 81 drawings were those that all of the children were able to 
name. Each picture was presented sequentially in the upper left of the. 
screen. The list length started at 6 items, and increased by one with 
each new trial. After four trials the list length reached 10 items and 
no further increments to the list length were made. The first four 
trials served as a transition from the practice session, and were 
excluded from later analysis. The pictorial stimuli for each trial were 
selected randomly. Repetitions within a trial's list were not allowed 
but no other limitations on the frequency of 'repetitions were imposed. 
Each item was displayed for approximately 900 ms, which was the time 
required to draw the picture on the monitor. The presentation of the 
next item followed.immediately. In the case of the final list, item, a 
retention interval of 1 s followed the presentation of the item.
Response phase. The response phase differed between the control 
and experimental groups. For the control group, a probe picture was 
displayed in the upper left of the screen. A red icon with a large, 
white letter X was displayed in the upper right of the screen. The red 
icon was approximately the same size as the probe picture.. If the probe 
was from among the pictures presented on the preceding list, a correct 
response was to touch the probe picture. If the probe was absent from 
the-list, a correct choice was to touch the letter X. A correct response 
earned a computer-generated reward sound, verbal.praise and a marble 
dispensed by the experimenter. An incorrect response resulted in a 
penalty sound (a brief buzz of approximately 500 ms) and no marble 
reward. These were the only response options presented to the control 
group. Thus, the control group performed the classical serial probe 
recognition task.
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The experimental group followed the same procedure, except that it
was also- offered an escape choice--the uncertain response. On each trial 
a yellow icon with a black question mark (2) in the' middle was 
illuminated in the lower center of the screen along with the probe 
picture and the letter X in their previously specified locations. All of 
the, icons were approximately the same In size (3 x 3.5 inches). Choosing 
the uncertain response cleared the current trial. A new trial, in which 
only one response was illuminated, followed. If the probe was from the 
list, the probe picture appeared on the screen. If it was not, the X was 
displayed. The reward was secured by touching the displayed object.
In order to prevent the overuse of the uncertainty choice, its 
cost was actively modified. The program calculated the ratio of recent 
escapes to primary responses. If (recent escapes - recent primaries) 
exceeded four, the use of the uncertain response froze the touchscreen 
for a period of time. This period was determined by the formula (recent ■ 
escapes - recent primary responses)2 x 50 ms. Therefore, the overuse of 
the uncertain response resulted in the delayed opportunity to give a 
response that would be registered by the touchscreen and thus in the 
delayed reward. The cost of overusing the uncertain response was 
designed to discourage participants from employing it when they knew the 
correct answer, saving it for the instances in which their memory trace 
was more indeterminate. The experimenter gave the children a verbal 
explanation of this circumstance, stating the "the computer is tired 
from so many questions, because we have been asking the computer for 
help too many times".
The computer was programmed so that 40% of the trials were those 
in which the probe picture was absent from the list ("not there" 
trials), and the remaining 60% were "there" trials. This trial 
distribution was chosen to maximize the number of trials per serial 
position but at the same, time not to prompt children to use the probe as
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a default response. The computer program was set to present the trials
using the following rules: for every 10 trials, six were "there" and
four were "not there" trials; for every ten "there" trials, there was
one probe per serial position.
The experiment lasted approximately 40 minutes, and each child 
completed an average of 45 experimental trials in addition to the 
average of 5 practice trials. At the beginning of the experiment, each 
participant heard the instructions (see Appendix) told by the 
experimenter. Each participant was given several trials to practice 
responding using the touchscreen. The practice trials differed from the 
experimental trials in their list length. The list length for the 
practice trials- started at 4 items, and increased by one- with each new 
trial. During this time, the researcher had an opportunity to check for 
children's correct understanding of the instructions. The children were 
asked whether or not they saw the probe picture, and what would be the 
appropriate response to give in that situation. If they responded 
correctly, the practice trial session was terminated, and the 
experimental session was started.
At the end of the experiment, the children were given positive 
verbal feedback. The experimenter reassured ;them of their good 
performance on the task. Each child received on average 8 stickers of 
his or her choice from a motivational sticker collection in exchange for 
the marbles, irrespective of marbles gained. In addition, children who 
participated in the experiment (or their parents) received five dollars 
in gift certificates to Dairy Queen or cash, depending on their choice. , 
Pilot Study
There was a pilot study conducted prior to the actual experiment. 
Eleven 5-year-olds (mean age = 5.07, SD=0.53) participated in this 
study. One child's results were'excluded from the analysis because of 
his inability and/or lack of motivation to attend to' the presentation of
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the pictorial stimuli. Children from the pilot study were not eligible
for participation in the later study.
Children in the pilot study performed the same experimental task
as -described above, but the task parameters were manipulated across
participants. These calibration trials were designed to determine
parameters that would yield the appropriate level of difficulty for the
experimental task. Careful examination of children's performance under
different conditions allowed us to determine more appropriate length of
the interstimulus interval, stimulus presentation duration, as well as
the list length, and the pattern of the practice trials. In addition,
the pilot study indicated the necessity of implementing the trial-
initiation response that had allowed children to focus their attention




Children's primary memory performance was considered for a list 
length of 10 items. The first four trials for jeach child with list 
lengths of 6,7,8 and 9 items were aimed only for training purposes, and 
were excluded from the analysis. Table 1 summarizes the percentage 
correct for each serial position, all the trials combined and all "not 
there" trials for the experimental and control groups.
Insert Table .1 about here
The possibility of temporal effects, such .as fatigue, was explored 
by dividing each child's data into two equal halves. The first and 
second halves of the children's trials were analyzed separately. Table 2 
summarizes the percentage of correct for this • split-half data,
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Insert'Table 2 about here
Memory Monitoring and the Use of the Uncertain Response ■
In the experimental group, children's performance was further
evaluated on the basis of their use of the uncertain (escape) response. 
Figure 1A illustrates their escape behavior in relation to their primary 
memory performance. For comparison, the primary memory performance of 
the control group, which was not allowed the escape response, is
depicted in Figure IB.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Split-half analysis was again conducted to evaluate the potential 
temporal effects on the data. Figure 2 depicts this divided performance 
for the experimental and control groups. Figures 2A and 2B illustrate 
the performance of the experimental group on the first and second halves 
of trials, respectively.. Correspondingly, figures 2C and 2D depict the 
performance of the control‘group on the first and second halves of 
trials, respectively.
Insert Figure- 2 about here
. Signal Detection Analysis of Performance
The data are particularly well suited to a signal detection 
analysis, a technique commonly used in studies on perception and 
cognition. In signal detection theory, as described by MacMillan and 
Creelman (1991), performance is analyzed according to the degree to 
which the participants' responses reflect the stimuli and the degree to 
which participants show bias in their responding.'
Uncertain Responses 25 
Sensitivity. Sensitivity refers to the participant's ability to
discriminate between stimuli. In this context, sensitivity was measured
by the degree to which "there" and "not there" responses mirrored
"there" and "not there" items. If the probe was from among the pictures
presented on the list ("there" item), a correct response was to touch
the probe picture ("there" response). In signal-detection theory
terminology, correctly recognizing the "there" item is termed a hit;
while failing to recognize it (touching the X) is a miss. If the probe
was absent from the list ("not there" item), a correct choice was to
touch the letter X ("not there" response). Correctly responding "not
there" is termed a correct rejection. Erroneously recognizing an item as
"there" is a false alarm. The data can be summarized in a 2x2 table
displaying either the frequencies of these four events occurring or
their response rates calculated as the proportion of trials the
participant made a particular response. Table .3 shows.the frequencies
and proportions of the correct responses (hits and correct rejections)
as well as the incorrect responses (misses and false alarms) for the
experimental and control groups.
Insert Table 3 about here
A sensitivity measure can be obtained from the discrepancy between 
a hit rate and a false alarm rate. Signal Detection Theory offers a 
sensitivity measure called d' (d-prime). Computing d-prime requires 
first a z-transformation, which converts a hit and false alarm rate to 
standard deviation units or z-scores, and then d-prime is obtained as a 
difference between these transformed hit and false alarm rates. Hence, 
the resulting formula for d-prime is: 
d' = z(H)-z(F).
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First, the overall d-primes for the experimental and control
groups were calculated. The d-prime for the experimental group was 1.08
and the d-prime for the control group was 0.73. Thus, the experimental
group showed an increase of 0.35 standard deviation units in sensitivity
as compared to the control group.
Second, the individual d-primes were computed for each participant
in both groups. A directional, two-independent samples t-test was
conducted on these d-primes to compare the sensitivity of the
experimental and control groups (t (38)=1.585, £=0.061). These findings
suggest that there was no difference at alpha=0.05 level between the
means of d-primes for the experimental and control groups.
Third, each data file was again- divided into two equal halves to
check for possible temporal effects. Two d-primes, one for the first
half, the other for the second half of the trials were computed for each
child. A directional two-independent samples t-test was performed to
compare the differences in sensitivity between the experimental and
control groups on the first half of the trials {t (38)=2.064, £=0.023).
/
The same statistical technique- was executed for the d-primes from the 
second half of the trials (t(38)=0.7, £=0.244). These results indicate 
that the mean d-prime for.the experimental group was significantly 
higher than that of the control group for the first half of the trials. 
However, this difference was eliminated for the second half of the 
trials. Figure 3 illustrates the mean d-primes for the experimental and 
control groups in the first and the second halves of trials.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Response bias. Response bias refers to the inclination to favor 
one response over another. The most commonly used bias measure for
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signal detection analysis is called criterion location (c), and is
defined as c=-0.5[z(H)+z(F)].
In the context of the presented experimental scenario this means 
that a positive bias is a tendency to favor the "not there" response 
(X). Consequently, a negative bias is a tendency to prefer "there" 
response (probe).
An overall response bias as measured by the criterion location (c) 
was computed for the experimental and control group. The control group 
exhibited a relatively strong negative bias (c=-0.298) preferring 
"there" over the "not there" response. This was more than double that of 
the bias of the experimental group (c=-0.131).
Discussion
Both experimental and control groups exhibited serial position 
effects in their primary memory performance (see Figures 1A and IB). 
However, the escape responses for the experimental group did not mirror 
their primary memory performance (Figure 1A). It is possible that the 
variability in memory abilities among participants contributed to the 
lack of positive findings. Although their primary memory performance 
mimicked the well-established findings of serial position effects, the 
feelings of uncertainty may be more subjective in this age group. These 
feelings of uncertainty may have differed in content and degree from one 
child to another and thus may have been more susceptible to the 
averaging effects present in the graphs of overall performance, which 
are insensitive to inter-individual differences. Although studies with 
human adults have also used the. between-subject design and evaluated the 
overall performance of the whole group, younger children may exhibit 
greater inter-individual fluctuations in performance. This can occur 
because their cognitive abilities including memory monitoring are 
subject to change during the course of development. Unfortunately, it 
was not feasible to obtain a clear .graphical description of each child's
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performance on different serial position trials due to the relatively
small number of trials for each child.
Additionally, the overall performance was evaluated on a temporal 
basis for possible practice . effects and/or effects of fatigue. Given the 
inconclusive results, it was suspected that children's performance might 
have changed during the course of the experiment. Therefore, the data 
from each child was divided into two equal halves. The overall 
performance on the first half of the trials was evaluated separately 
from the data on the second half. Alas, this' division, which resulted in 
a smaller number of trials evaluated in each group, led to an even 
greater variability in the results rendering the detection of stable 
trends via the means of graphical analysis unattainable.
It is possible that, in addition to the differences in ability, 
the relatedness of some stimuli and their repetitions affected primary 
memory performance and memory monitoring accuracy. Except for 
repetitions within a trial's list that were not allowed, no other 
restrictions on the frequency of repetitions were imposed. Therefore, it 
is plausible to assume that participants, who viewed a particular 
picture in a .trial's list at an easier serial position earlier on in the 
game, could have carried over their memory of this picture to the latter 
trials. In the latter trials this- picture was tested as a probe from a 
more difficult serial- position. This more difficult-to-remember serial 
position that was hypothesized to yield a more indeterminate memory 
trace, although remembered for wrong reasons, nevertheless produced a 
correct response. Hence, participants' performance might have been 
influenced by these repetitions, which 'led to an obscured picture of 
memory monitoring occurrence.
The visual similarity of some stimuli could have also obfuscated 
participants' memory performance. Children may have confused one picture 
with another if these shared several visual features (e.g. a picture of
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a lioness and a picture of a tiger, or a printer and a typewriter). In
addition, the visual attractiveness or a personal significance of some
stimuli could have obscured memory performance as well. Although the
presentation of stimuli was very brief, and. for the most part children
did not have the time to verbally label or comment on the stimuli, it
has happened that a child, delighted by a particular picture,.labeled
the picture during the presentation phase. If this picture then came up
as a probe, the memory of- it was enhanced by the child's verbalization
and, regardless of the serial position of this picture, the child gave a
correct answer.
Furthermore, as Kelemen, Frost and Weaver (2000) suggested, 
guessing generates noise that can distort metacognitive accuracy in 
recognition predictions. Thus, participants, who do in fact monitor 
their memory accurately, might exhibit ambiguous metacognitive 
performance because' they guessed on the items they did not know. 
Consequently, correct guessing could have contributed to the added 
variability within our data and prevented us from finding the escape 
curve that would mirror participants' primary memory performance.
The aforementioned reasons have led to a search for a measure of 
cognitive performance that could evaluate the overall performance of 
both' of the groups, as well as that of the individual participants, 
without taking into consideration the serial positions of the probes. It. 
was suggested that signal-detection analysis (SDA) could handle this 
task. There is a particular advantage to using SDA as the means for 
evaluating memory performance. SDA offers a measure of memory 
sensitivity that is independent of the participants' bias to favor one 
response over another. The. mechanics of SDA were explained in the 
Results section.
■ Only the hit rate was explicitly utilized in the initial graphical 
analysis, which could have lead to a rather inaccurate picture. With
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only one number (proportion of hits) at hand, one would miss an
important piece of information. Obviously, a participant who yields a
hit rate of 0.85 and a false alarm rate of 0.3 is more sensitive than a
participant who generates a hit rate of 0.85 but also a false alarm rate
of 0.85. Clearly, the second case indicates that the participant favored
the "there" response with no correspondence to the actual stimulus.
Hence', the proportion of correct responses as a single indicator of
performance is appropriate only when there is no tendency to prefer one
response over another. In this study, the proportion of "there” and "not
there" trials was not equal, but was instead set on 60% and 40%,
respectively. Therefore, the signal-detection analysis offered a more
appropriate, measure of performance, given the experimenter-implemented
bias, in addition to the bias potentially used by our participants'.
The comparison of individual d-primes was not statistically 
significant, suggesting no difference between the experimental and 
control groups with regard to sensitivity.
However, the results indicate that the control group had a 
tendency to prefer the "there" response over the "not there" response. 
This was documented by their negative response bias, which was more than 
double the1 bias of the experimental group. It is possible that 
participants in the control group used the -'there" response as a default 
when unsure., Paradoxically, this in turn could have contributed to the 
higher overall percentage of correct responses because the distribution 
of "there" and "not there" trials was set on 60% and 40%, respectively. 
In other words, this means that even if the participant was completely 
oblivious to the. stimuli and used the "there" response on all trials 
indiscriminately, this participant would still yield a rate of 60% 
correct responses.
Perhaps our failure to find the significant overall improvement in­
memory performance for the experimental-group was in part caused by the
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fact that the control group used the "there" response as a default in
situations when unsure. Consequently, this guessing, which was correct
the majority of the time due to the trial distribution, inadvertently
improved their performance.
Still, the subsequent analyses of the first and the second halves 
of children's trials indicated that the sensitivity in discrimination 
between stimuli was different for the experimental and control groups. 
The participants in the experimental group were significantly more 
sensitive in discrimination between stimuli than children in the control 
group for the first half of their trials. This sensitivity, however, 
changed during the second half of the experiment when there were no 
significant differences between the experimental and control groups. 
These findings suggest that the performance of the experimental group 
was superior to that of the control group during the first half of the 
experiment. During the second half of the experiment, fatigue could have 
played a role in children's ability to discriminate between stimuli 
annulling the advantage of the experimental group. The fatigue could 
have resulted from the increased demands on children in the experimental 
group, who were required to perform an additional task, namely, to 
explicitly monitor their memory in terms of using the uncertain 
response. Children in the control group did not have this additional 
demand on their 'resources, and in fact their mean performance was marked 
by a slight increase in sensitivity for the second half of the trials 
(see Figure 3). Children in the control group' actually might have 
benefited from additional practice as the trials progressed.
Although the effects of fatigue and practice were not the subjects 
of inquiry in the present study, the possibility of these two factors 
influencing the results is worth mentioning and certainly worthy of 
exploration in future research'endeavors. In the light of discussion 
recently- revisited in the metacognition literature pertaining to the
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issue of conscious versus unconscious metacognitive processing, the
potential effect of fatigue on the ability to monitor memory processing
is very interesting. Hasher and Zacks (1979) suggested that the
processes underlying cognition can be either automatic or effortful.
Effortful processing requires conscious attention, but automatic
processing makes minimal demands on attentional resources. If memory
monitoring is indeed subject to the effects of fatigue, then that would
suggest that this type of metacognition requires conscious processing.
It would be of course premature to make any conclusions pertaining to
this issue, but this idea may serve as a pointer for future research.
Several comments and improvements are suggested for future 
investigations. A larger sample size would increase the power of the 
statistical analyses and the potential effect size. The second 
recommendation relates to the innovation of the experimental design. A 
within-subj'ect, repeated measures design that would yield a higher 
number of trials, per participant seems a logical next step in this line 
of research. If the participants could be tested on several occasions, 
serving as their own controls, the noise created by large inter­
individual differences would be dramatically reduced. Additionally, it 
would allow clearer answers for some questions generated in this study- 
such as: Does the experimental task that offers the escape/uncertain 
response make additional demands on attentional resources or is the 
performance of the control task influenced’by practice?
The experimental task itself could also be improved. For example, 
imposing more severe restrictions on the frequency of stimuli 
repetitions, and changing the trial distribution ratio could help to 
obtain a clearer picture of primary memory and memory monitoring 
performance. Substituting pictures of familiar objects for pictorial 
stimuli with distinct geometrical shapes could decrease problems with 
verbal labeling, as well as the possible personal- significance of
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-stimuli. On the other hand, this change could decrease the
attractiveness of the experimental task itself, and children's interest
in playing' the game would be compromised.
Having learned about some of the difficulties-in using this 
experimental paradigm for testing five-year-old children, it would be 
interesting to.investigate younger children with an improved design. A 
developmental comparison of memory monitoring abilities across several 
different ages would not only be exciting but also very instructive in 
the field of metacognitive research.
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We are going to play a game now. First, you have to .touch a circle 
that will come up on the screen. The computer will then show you a list 
of eight pictures. You watch those pictures carefully. Then, the 
computer will show you one picture, and two signs [the experimenter 
shows the child two cards, one with the letter X_j_ the other with the 
question■mark _?]• this picture was in the list that the computer 
showed you, let the computer know by touching'the picture. If it wasn't 
in the list, touch the letter X. If you don't know, touch the sign If 
you touch the sign ?, the computer will show you a correct answer. Then 
touch that answer.
If you were right, the computer will make a beep sound and I will 
give you a marble. We will play this game many times. Try to get as many 
marbles as you can. At the end of our playing, you can exchange the 
marbles you won for a toy you choose. We have some toys here. .
If you were wrong, the computer will make a buzz, and I will not 
give you a marble. After that we will start again and play a new game. 
You start a new game by touching the circle that will appear on the 
screen.
Now, let me show you how it works. If you don't understand, just 
ask me, and I will show you again: Then, you will try it three times, 
and after that,'you can start playing.
Control Group Instructions
We are. going to play a game now. First, you have to touch a circle 
that will come up on the screen. The computer will then show you a list 
of eight pictures. You watch those pictures carefully. Then, the 
computer will show you one picture, and one sign [the experimenter shows 
the child one card with the letter X]. If this picture was in the list
Uncertain Responses 40 
the computer showed you, let the computer know by touching the picture.
If it wasn't in the list, touch the letter X.
If you were right, the computer will make a beep sound and I will 
give you a'marble. We will play this game many times. Try to get as many 
marbles as you can. At the end of our playing, you can exchange .the 
marbles you won for a toy you choose. We have some toys here.
If you were wrong, the computer will make a buzz, and I will not 
give you a marble. After that we will start again and play a new game. 
You start a new game by touching a circle that will appear on the 
screen.
Now, let me show you how it works. If you don't understand,, just 
ask me, and I will show you again. Then, you will try it three times, 
and after that, you can start playing.
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Table 1













All T 75 75
All NT 66 53
Overall 71 66
Note: SP = serial position; All T = all "there" trials combined; All NT 
= all "not there" trials combined
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Table 2
Percentage of Correct Responses for the Split-Half Data
Trial
Type
Experimental Group Control Group
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
SP1 88 65 72 78
SP2 71 84 74 65
SP3 75 64 67 ' 37
SP4 73 56 58 82
SP5 74 75 67 84
SP6 77 65 76 86
SP7 .69 76 60 87
SP8 87 65 95 92
SP9 83 76 77 75.
SP10 86 . 83 83 71
ALL T 79 71 73 76
ALL NT 67 64 56 49
OVERALL 74 68 66 65'
Note: SP=serial position; All T=all "there" trials combined; All NT=all 
"not there" ' trials combined
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Table 3
Siqnal-Detection Distribution of Responses
_____________ GROUP_________
Response Type Experimental Control
Hits 341 283
False alarms 145 83
Misses ' 116 95
Correct rejections 161 160
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Figure Captions
Figure 1A. Serial probe recognition performance for the experimental 
group. Percentage of correct responses and escaped trials (when 
applicable) is shown. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe had not 
been in the preceding list.
Figure IB. Serial probe recognition performance for the control group. 
Percentage of correct responses and escaped trials (when applicable) is 
shown. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe had not been in the 
preceding list.
Figure 2A. Serial probe recognition, performance on the first half of the 
trials for the experimental group. NT = "not there" trials in which the 
probe had not been in the preceding list.
Figure 2B. Serial probe recognition performance on the second half of 
the trials for the experimental group. NT = "not there" trials in which 
the probe had not been in the preceding list.
Figure 2C. Serial probe recognition performance on the first half of the 
trials for the control group. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe 
had not been, in the preceding list.
Figure 2D. Serial probe recognition performance on the second of the 
trials for the control group. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe 
had not been in the preceding list.
Figure 3. Change in mean sensitivity (d-primes) for the first and second 
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